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6	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America		
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8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 2:20-CR-35-JAM	
12	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;	
13	v.	FINDINGS AND ORDER	
14	OBDULIO JIMÉNEZ, DANIEL JOE BOBIAN,	DATE: June 8, 2021 TIME: 9:30 a.m.	
15	JOSE MANUEL AGUIĹERA BARBOSA,	COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez	
16	Defendants.		
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18	By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 8, 2021. By this stipulation and		
19	proposed order, the parties respectfully request that the Court continue the status conference until		
20	July 27, 2021. To the extent it is needed, this stipulation supplements the basis for exclusion of time		
21	under the Court's General Orders addressing public health concerns, and requests that the Court also		
22	exclude time between June 8, 2021, and July 27, 2021, under Local Code T4, for the reasons set forth		
23	below.		
24	Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has		
25	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive		
26	openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.		
27	Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no		
28	exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). <i>Id.</i> at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. <i>Id.</i> at		

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509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). <sup>1</sup> The parties note that the Court has already designated a new date for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

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## **STIPULATION**

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Obdulio JIMÉNEZ and Daniel Joe BOBIAN, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. The undersigned defendants now move to exclude time between June 8, 2021, and July 27, 2021, per Local Code T4, in addition to the exclusion of time the Court has already ordered in light of public health concerns cited by General Orders. Defendant Jose Manuel Aguilera BARBOSA has not yet appeared in this matter, and therefore does not join in this stipulation.
  - 2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
  - a) The government has produced 100 pages of discovery associated with this case, includes law enforcement reports, photographs, and investigative reports. This discovery has been produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying.
  - b) Counsel for defendants need further time to consult with their clients, review discovery, investigate evidence and potential defense strategies, and otherwise prepare for trial.
  - c) Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
    - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
  - e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
  - f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 8, 2021 to July 27, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

1	3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the		
2	Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial		
3	3 must commence.		
4	4 IT IS SO STIPULATED.		
5		LLIP A. TALBERT	
6	6	ng United States Attorney	
7	7   JAN	AMES R. CONOLLY IES R. CONOLLY	
8	Assi	stant United States Attorney	
9	D . 1 T . 4 2021	ENNIFER MOUZIS	
10	JEN	NIFER MOUZIS nsel for Defendant	
11	DA	NIEL JOE BOBIAN	
12	STE	TEFAN E. SACKS FAN E. SACKS	
13	Cou	nsel for Defendant	
14	4	DULIO JIMÉNEZ	
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17	FINDINGS AND ORDER		
18	IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 4 <sup>th</sup> day of June, 2021.		
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21	. II	hn A. Mendez HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ	
22	TINIT	TED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
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